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Perhaps the quantum state represents information about reality, and not reality directly. Wave
function collapse is then possibly no more mysterious than a Bayesian update of a probability
distribution given new data. We consider models for quantum systems with measurement outcomes
determined by an underlying physical state of the system but where several quantum states are
consistent with a single underlying state—i.e., probability distributions for distinct quantum states
overlap. Significantly, we demonstrate by example that additional assumptions are always necessary
to rule out such a model.
Broadly speaking, physicists today view the quantum
state in one of two ways: in correspondence with the
real physical state of affairs or as representing only an
agent’s knowledge or information about some aspect of
the physical situation. The latter ‘epistemic’ viewpoint
is primarily motivated by the obvious parallel between
the quantum process of instantaneous wavefunction col-
lapse, and the classical procedure of instantaneous up-
dating of a probability distribution, both of which occur
upon the acquisition of information regarding the out-
come of a measurement process. The epistemic view has
a long history of illustrious advocates [1–8]. In recent
times a research programme has arisen aimed at not only
philosophically justifying the epistemic view, but poten-
tially deriving quantum theory from more primitive con-
siderations about information and/or Bayesian reasoning
[8–16].
At least two versions of the epistemic view can be dis-
tinguished. One is operational: the quantum state rep-
resents information about which outcome will occur if a
measurement is performed on the system. Measurement
itself is treated as a primitive. The other is that the quan-
tum state represents information about some underlying
physical state of the system, where this underlying state
need not be described by quantum theory.
In his 1935 letter to Schro¨dinger, in an attempt to
explain what he really meant in the EPR paper, Einstein
writes [17, 18, p. 26]:
But then for the same [real] state of [the
system] there are two (in general arbitrarily
many) equally justified Ψ, which contradicts
the hypothesis of a one-to-one or complete
∗This article was published by the American Physical Society un-
der the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
Further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the
authors and the published article’s title, journal citation (PRL 109,
150404 (2012)), and DOI (10.1103/PhysRevLett.109.150404).
†Electronic address: 1@physics.org
description of the real states.
Einstein came to this conclusion, which he termed ‘in-
completeness’ of the quantum state, using an argument
based on what we now call (following Schro¨dinger [19])
steering [20]. Note that the question he raises here is not
whether there are multiple states of reality associated
with a single wavefunction (one possible type of incom-
pleteness), but rather whether there are multiple wave-
functions associated with a single real state. A natural
way to understand this is as an expression of the sec-
ond kind of epistemic view above—that a quantum state
represents an agent’s information about an underlying
reality, but is not part of that reality itself.
Unfortunately, as shown later by Bell [37] Einstein’s
specific argument for incompleteness was based on a false
premise (locality). However, a question that stands on
its own and is the topic of this article remains: is it even
mathematically possible to find an embedding of quan-
tum theory in some deeper theory where the quantum
states are not always uniquely determined given the un-
derlying physical state? Following [20], we refer to such
a possibility as a ψ-epistemic interpretation of the quan-
tum state.
Recently, a no-go theorem was proven [21] showing
that a ψ-epistemic interpretation is impossible. It is im-
portant to note that a key assumption of the argument
is preparation independence—situations where quantum
theory assigns independent product states are presumed
to be completely describable by independently combin-
ing the two purportedly deeper descriptions for each sys-
tem. Here, we will show via explicit constructions that
without this assumption, ψ-epistemic models can be con-
structed with all quantum predictions retained. Hence,
we show that not only is the ‘preparation independence’
assumption of that particular no-go theorem necessary,
but also any similar no-go theorem will require non-trivial
assumptions beyond those required for a well-formed on-
tological model.
One of the most compelling motivations for exploring
the ψ-epistemic view is the amazing range of phenom-
ar
X
iv
:1
20
1.
65
54
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
9 N
ov
 20
12
2ena, normally considered uniquely quantum, that can be
derived by imposing only a simple principle restricting
an agent’s knowledge about a presumed underlying real-
ity [8, 22, 23]. It is clear that the primary reason these
theories do manage to reproduce so many quantum-like
phenomena is that the states of knowledge (probability
distributions) overlap on a non-trivial subset of the un-
derlying space of ‘hidden’ states, even when the agent’s
knowledge is maximal (the equivalent of a quantum pure
state).
These toy theories do not, however, reproduce all
quantum states and measurement statistics. About such
theories which do reproduce all of quantum theory much
less is known—the main examples and constraints are
outlined in [24]. In [25] Hardy showed that the under-
lying mathematical space of real states on which such
theories are defined—the ‘ontic state’ space—must have
cardinality at least that of the integers. Spekkens [26]
showed the models must be preparation contextual in ad-
dition to measurement contextual [27]. The manifold di-
mension of the ontic state space was shown by Montina
[28] to be necessarily exponential assuming that the dy-
namics of the ontic states is Markovian; he then went
on to show the intriguing result that it is possible to re-
duce the manifold dimension by one [29, 30]. This latter
construction results in probability distributions that in-
tersect in the ontic state space, however they do so only
on a set of measure 0. The question of economic rep-
resentation of finite data in such models [15, 31–33] has
also received some attention.
In another pair of recent works [34, 35], Colbeck and
Renner have argued that, given additional assumptions
of experimenters’ free choice in choosing measurement
settings and no superluminal signaling of the choice at
the ontic level, the ontic states must be in one-to-one
correspondence with the quantum states. The models
of the present Letter are explicitly constructed for single
systems only and, if applied to systems composed of mul-
tiple separated subsystems, would involve superluminal
influences of measurement choices upon ontic variables.
Hence, our results are consistent with those of [34, 35].
Formal statement of the problem.–Following [20], an
ontological model for a quantum system defines a measure
space Λ, the elements λ of which are termed ontic states.
These should be thought of as the underlying physical
states that a system can be in at a given time. A pure
quantum state |ψ〉 corresponds to an equivalence class
of experimental preparations, and is represented within
an ontological model as a probability distribution µψ(λ)
over Λ. The distribution µψ is called an epistemic state.
It represents the information that an agent has about
the ontic state of a system, given that it was prepared
in a particular way. Dynamics correspond to trajecto-
ries of ontic states through Λ, and these map to dy-
namical changes in the probability distributions over Λ.
This setting includes the standard Hilbert space descrip-
tion through the trivial assignment of Λ as the complex
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FIG. 1: Schematic of two ontic state spaces in different on-
tological models. The supports of epistemic states associated
with four quantum states are shown. In (a) each ontic state
is in the support of the epistemic state for at most one ψ: the
model is ψ-ontic. In (b) those ontic states in the highlighted
‘epistemic region’ E on the right do not uniquely identify a
quantum state, and could result from either of the associated
preparation procedures: the model is ψ-epistemic.
projective space CP d−1 (the boundary of the quantum
state space), and µψ(λ) being a delta-function distribu-
tion centred at λ = |ψ〉〈ψ| [36]. It is for this reason the
term ‘ontic’ is used—as opposed to ‘hidden’, for example.
Throughout, we shall consider only projective mea-
surements on a finite d-dimensional quantum sys-
tem, described as a string of rank-1 projectors Φ =
{|φ0〉〈φ0|, · · · , |φd−1〉〈φd−1|}, where
∑
k |φk〉〈φk| = 1. If
a measurement is performed, the probabilities for differ-
ent outcomes are defined by the ontic state λ of the sys-
tem. Hence each measurement is associated with a set of
d response functions {ξφk : Λ → [0, 1]}, where ξφk(λ) is
the probability of obtaining the outcome |φk〉〈φk| when
the ontic state of the system is λ. The response func-
tions are positive semi-definite and normalized so that∑
k ξφk(λ) = 1,∀λ. If the ξφk(λ) take values only in {0, 1}
the model is deterministic. By the Kochen-Specker theo-
rem [27], a deterministic ontological model for a quantum
system must be measurement contextual [24] if the sys-
tem has dimension d ≥ 3. This means that the response
function ξφk depends on the complete set of co-measured
projectors in Φ. We do not indicate this dependence for
notational simplicity.
An ontological model is successful in explaining quan-
tum measurement statistics for measurement Φ and
preparation |ψ〉 if and only if it is the case that ∀k:∫
Λ
ξφk(λ)dµψ =
∫
Λ
µψ(λ)ξφk(λ)dλ = |〈φk|ψ〉|2. (1)
With these basic ingredients in place, an ontological
model is ψ-epistemic if at least two distinct quantum
states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are described by distributions µψ1
and µψ2 such that the intersection of their supports has
non-zero measure, shown schematically in Fig. 1. An
ontological model is ψ-ontic otherwise [20, 26]. The idea
3here is that in a ψ-ontic model, the quantum state is
uniquely determined by the ontic state λ, since for any
λ, there is only one |ψ〉 such that λ is contained in the
support of µψ. In this case, although the quantum state
|ψ〉 plays an epistemic role in defining a distribution µψ,
the quantum state is also a function of the ontic state,
hence can justifiably be thought of as a physical property
of the system. Informally, the whole of the quantum state
|ψ〉 is ‘written into’ the real state of affairs.
In a ψ-epistemic model, on the other hand, there are
at least some circumstances in which two different quan-
tum states describe systems in the same ontic state λ. In
this case, it is defensible to claim that the quantum state
‘merely’ represents an agent’s information. A stronger
definition of the term ψ-epistemic would require that for
any non-orthogonal states, |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, the distribu-
tions µψ1 and µψ2 overlap. In this Letter, we stick with
the weaker definition above.
The original Bell model.–As a counterexample to ‘von-
Neumann’s silly assumption’ Bell [37] described a simple
ontological model capable of describing a quantum sys-
tem of dimension d. The ontic state space consists of
pairs (|λ〉, x), where |λ〉 is an element of CP d−1 and x
is an element of the interval [0, 1]. For the moment con-
sider d = 2. The ontic state space is then isomorphic to
Λ = S2 × [0, 1], where S2 is the two-dimensional Bloch
sphere. The quantum state |ψ〉 corresponds to a distri-
bution µψ(λˆ, x) = δ(λˆ − ψˆ), where the convention here,
and in what follows, is to denote the unit Bloch vector
associated to |ψ〉 as ψˆ. This choice of distribution is uni-
form over the subset {(ψˆ, x) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. The model is
deterministic, with response functions given by
ξφk(λˆ, x) = Θ
[
(|〈λ|φ0〉|2 − x)(−1)k
]
, (2)
where Θ is the Heaviside step function. For a projective
measurement outcome |φ〉〈φ| and a quantum state |ψ〉,
the Born rule is satisfied since∫
dλˆdx µψ(λˆ, x)ξφ(λˆ, x) = |〈ψ|φ〉|2. (3)
Note—as Bell did—that there are many possible
choices for the response functions that would work
equally well. The only requirement is that the support
over the subset {(λˆ, x) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1} has measure equal
to the probability occurring in the Born rule; how this
support is distributed is entirely arbitrary.
A ψ-epistemic modification of the Bell model for a
qubit.–The Bell model is ψ-ontic, since no two epistemic
states, corresponding to distinct quantum states, overlap.
A different ontological model for qubit systems was de-
scribed by Kochen and Specker [27], which is ψ-epistemic.
To date, however, no one has extended Kochen and
Specker’s model to systems of higher dimension than two
[38]. This section shows how the Bell model can be mod-
ified in order to obtain a ψ-epistemic model for qubits.
Later, this model is extended to obtain a ψ-epistemic
model for quantum systems of arbitrary finite dimension.
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FIG. 2: (a) Unmodified Bell model ontic state space along
with supports of a response function for outcome φˆ0 (green),
φˆ1 (blue) and epistemic state µψ (red line). The inner circle
is the surface of the Bloch sphere, the dashed line indicates it
also corresponds to x = 0. The outer solid circle corresponds
to x = 1. (b) Modified Bell model, showing the subsets E0
and E1. Any probability weight that µψ gives to ontic states
within E0 can be redistributed over E0.
A simple visualization of the ontic state space Λ as an
annulus with λˆ specifying the direction, and x the radial
distance is depicted in Fig. 2(a). Let zˆ correspond to the
north pole of the Bloch sphere, and let λˆ · zˆ = cos(θλ),
where θλ is the polar angle of the Bloch vector λˆ. Label
the upper (θλ < pi/2) hemisphere R0 and the lower (θλ >
pi/2) hemisphere R1. Given a projective measurement
Φ = {|φ0〉〈φ0|, |φ1〉〈φ1|}, assume that the outcomes are
labelled such that |〈φ0|z〉|2 ≥ |〈φ1|z〉|2.
With response functions defined as in Eq. (2), the ontic
states in the set
E0 =
{
(λˆ, x) : λˆ ∈ R0 and 0 ≤ x < (1− sin θλ)/2
}
(4)
all result in the φˆ0 outcome for any measurement Φ. Sim-
ilarly, those in the set
E1 =
{
(λˆ, x) : λˆ ∈ R1 and (1 + sin θλ)/2 < x ≤ 1
}
(5)
all result in the φˆ1 outcome. These sets are illustrated in
Fig. 2(b).
In order to construct a ψ-epistemic model, note that if
an epistemic state µψ assigns non-zero probability to the
subset E0, then this much probability weight can be redis-
tributed over E0 without changing the Born rule statis-
tics. This is because ontic states in E0 behave identi-
cally to one another, as far as predictions for quantum
measurement outcomes go. Similarly E1. Hence define a
modified Bell model such that for ψˆ ∈ R0,
µψ(λˆ, x) = δ(λˆ− ψˆ)Θ
(
x− 1
2
(1− sin θψ)
)
+
1
2
(1− sin θψ)µE0(λˆ, x)
4where θψ is the polar angle of ψˆ, and µE0 is essentially
arbitrary but can be taken to be the uniform distribution
over E0. A similar expression defines µψ for states with
ψˆ ∈ R1.
The modified Bell model still reproduces the Born rule,
but now the model is ψ-epistemic. Any two quantum
states in the same hemisphere are described by distribu-
tions that overlap, either in E0 or in E1. The preparation
of an ontic state from either of these regions does not
reveal a unique quantum state, but only reveals in which
hemisphere the quantum state resides.
ψ-epistemic modification in higher dimensions.–Here,
we modify the Bell model to produce a ψ-epistemic model
for arbitrary finite dimension. The ontic state space for
the d-dimensional Bell model is Λ = CP d−1 × [0, 1].
The distribution corresponding to a quantum state |ψ〉
is given by µψ(|λ〉, x) = δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉). Response functions
for a measurement Φ are defined such that ξφk has sup-
port of length |〈φk|λ〉|2 on the line segment {(|λ〉, x) : 0 ≤
x ≤ 1}. Up to this constraint the response functions are
arbitrary. This model is ψ-ontic since the delta functions
do not overlap for distinct |ψ〉.
In order to construct a ψ-epistemic model, fix an ar-
bitrary preferred state |0〉. For each measurement Φ, as-
sume that the outcomes are ordered such that |〈φ0|0〉|2 ≥
|〈φ1|0〉|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |〈φd−1|0〉|2. Fix the response functions
so that
ξφk(|λ〉, x) = 1 if
k−1∑
i=0
|〈λ|φi〉|2 ≤ x <
k∑
i=0
|〈λ|φi〉|2
(6)
and
ξφk(|λ〉, x) = 0 otherwise. (7)
In Equation (6),
∑k−1
i=1 |〈λ|φi〉|2 is taken to be 0 when
k = 0. For completeness, let us specify that for x = 1,
ξφk(|λ〉, x) = 1 iff k = d− 1.
Now the aim is to define a subset E0 of Λ, such that
ontic states in E0 predict the same outcomes for all mea-
surements. To this end, note that |〈φ0|0〉|2 ≥ 1/d. Given
this, it is easy to show that if |〈λ|0〉|2 > d−1d , then
|〈φ0|λ〉|2 > 0. For arbitrary |χ〉, let
z(|χ〉) = inf
|φ〉:|〈φ|0〉|2≥1/d
|〈φ|χ〉|2, (8)
where an explicit expression is easily found but not
needed. Define
E0 =
{
(|λ〉, x) : |〈λ|0〉|2 > d− 1
d
and 0 ≤ x < z(|λ〉)
}
.
(9)
Any ontic state λ ∈ E0 has the property that whatever
measurement is performed, the outcome is |φ0〉〈φ0|. The
epistemic states can therefore be modified as above to
produce a ψ-epistemic model. Informally, the idea is the
same: any probability that µψ assigns to ontic states
within the set E0 can be redistributed over the whole of E0
without changing Born rule statistics. More specifically,
when |〈ψ|0〉|2 ≤ (d− 1)/d, let
µψ(|λ〉, x) = δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉), (10)
and when |〈ψ|0〉|2 > (d− 1)/d, let
µψ(|λ〉, x) = δ(|λ〉−|ψ〉)Θ(x−z(|ψ〉))+z(|ψ〉)µE0(|λ〉, x),
(11)
where, as above, µE0 is arbitrary but could be taken to
be the uniform distribution over E0.
This model is clearly very contrived. A degree of sym-
metry could be restored by postulating a preferred basis
|0〉, . . . , |d− 1〉, instead of a preferred state. If |〈λ|j〉|2 >
(d−1)/d for some j, then relabel measurement outcomes
such that |〈φ0|j〉|2 ≥ |〈φ1|j〉|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |〈φd−1|j〉|2. In this
case |〈φ0|λ〉|2 > 0, and sets Ej can be defined in analogy
with E0 above. For any state |ψ〉 with |〈ψ|j〉|2 > (d−1)/d,
any probability assigned to ontic states within Ej can be
redistributed over Ej . This results in a model that is
‘more epistemic’ than the one above. It is an open ques-
tion whether more natural models can be found.
Discussion.–Our results are particularly pertinent
given the recent no-go theorem of [21]. The theorem
shows that it is not possible to construct ψ-epistemic
models of quantum theory, given an assumption that
independent preparations produce uncorrelated ontic
states. The present Letter shows that ψ-epistemic models
are possible if that assumption is given up. None of these
models is intuitive or motivated by physical principles
or considerations. The primary motivation for exploring
the possibility of ψ-epistemic models is to understand the
formal limitations of reproducing quantum theory from
a deeper theory.
Such models may also play a useful role in other areas
of quantum information. The remarkable protocols of
Toner and Bacon [39] for recovering the bipartite mea-
surement statistics of a singlet state and classical sim-
ulation of teleportation—using only one and two bits
(respectively) of classical communication—make use of
shared randomness in a way that lets the problem be re-
cast in terms of correlated single qubit ontological models
that are ψ-epistemic. A related result has been obtained
by Montina [40], who has also put bounds on the classical
simulation cost for an arbitrary number of qubits.
There remain many open questions. In the models
presented, it is not the case that µψ has non-zero overlap
with µφ for any pair of non-orthogonal quantum states
|ψ〉 and |φ〉. Hence the models do not satisfy the stronger
definition of ψ-epistemic suggested above. It would be
interesting to establish whether such models exist. (Scott
Aaronson has recently combined some of the ideas that
were presented in a preprint version of this article with
those of George Lowther to answer this question in the
affirmative; see [42].)
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